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DEMAR HUGH CAMPBELL, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A047-927-750) 
Immigration Judge:  Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2020 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Demar Hugh Campbell seeks review of the final agency order authorizing his 
removal from the United States.  The Government has moved to dismiss Campbell’s 
petition for review (PFR) as untimely.  We deny that motion.  Additionally, because the 
only issue properly presented by Campbell lacks merit, we will deny the PFR. 
I. 
Campbell was born in Jamaica.  At age 17, he immigrated to the United States and 
obtained the status of a lawful permanent resident (LPR).  Several years later, he pleaded 
nolo contendere to a drug charge in Pennsylvania.  As a result, Campbell was served with 
a notice to appear, charging removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (making most 
drug convictions removable offenses).  After a bit of litigation before the agency, an 
immigration judge (IJ) granted relief in the form of cancellation of removal. 
But Campbell committed more crimes:  he was convicted of drug possession and, 
separately, aggravated assault.  A new notice to appear followed, charging removability 
under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (making aggravated felonies removable 
offenses) via § 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining “aggravated felony” as a “crime of violence” 
under 18 U.S.C. § 16), and § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (making the aggregation of two or more 
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), not arising out of a single 
scheme, a removable offense).  The IJ declined to sustain the aggravated felony and 
CIMT charges, but sustained the § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) charge.  The IJ determined, 




serious crime” (PSC) under the Immigration and Nationality Act, thus barring him from 
certain forms of relief.  
To defend against removal, Campbell argued that he had acquired United States 
citizenship when he first entered the United States, as a result of his grandmother’s earlier 
naturalization.  Campbell also filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal 
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on past and feared harm 
related to his sexual orientation.   
The IJ rejected the naturalization argument upon finding no evidence that 
Campbell satisfied the requirement that his grandmother was his legal guardian.  Because 
of the PSC, the IJ determined that Campbell was eligible only for deferral of removal 
under the CAT.  Cf. Bastardo-Vale v. Att’y Gen., 934 F.3d 255, 261, 265 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(en banc).  The IJ rejected the CAT claim, finding it unlikely that the Jamaican 
government would acquiesce to any harm Campbell might suffer.  The IJ ordered that 
Campbell be removed to Jamaica.    
By decision dated July 2, 2019, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
dismissed Campbell’s appeal.  It agreed with the IJ’s naturalization, PSC and CAT 
rulings, for substantially the reasons given by the IJ.  The BIA acknowledged three new 
letters submitted by Campbell on appeal, but determined that those letters did not warrant 
a remand to the IJ.      




Campbell filed the PFR from SCI-Dallas in Pennsylvania, the prison where he is serving 
time pursuant to his aggravated assault conviction. 
II. 
We first consider the timeliness of the PFR, in light of the Government’s motion 
to dismiss.  Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), “[a] petition for review must be filed within 
thirty days of the final removal order.” Verde-Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 198, 201 
(3d Cir. 2013).  That deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional; unique circumstances or 
other equitable considerations cannot excuse noncompliance.  See McAllister v. Att’y 
Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 
(2007).   
If the thirty-day time period began to run on July 2, 2019, when the BIA issued its 
decision, then Campbell’s PFR is untimely and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.  
Campbell is an inmate in state custody, so the prison mailbox rule is potentially in play. 
See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); cf. Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 
275, 278 (7th Cir. 2016).  Even still, the earliest filing date available to Campbell is 
August 12, 2019, when he signed his PFR. See Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“The federal ‘prisoner mailbox rule’ provides that a document is deemed 
filed on the date it is given to prison officials for mailing.”); cf. Fed. R. App. P. 
25(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that mailbox rule will aid inmate if he supplies evidence that 




last day for filing and . . . that postage was prepaid”).1  It thus might appear that 
Campbell filed his PFR more than a week too late. 
However, there is ample, uncontradicted evidence in the record that Campbell did 
not receive a copy of the BIA’s decision in a timely manner, through no fault of his own.  
Notably, the initial mailing of the BIA’s decision was received by Campbell’s place of 
incarceration on July 18, 2019, and the envelope was subsequently stamped “Return to 
Sender [-] No Inmate Number.”  AR 4.  Neither the envelope nor the enclosed decision 
contained Campbell’s inmate number, even though the BIA was well aware of that 
component of his mailing address. See, e.g., AR 20 (BIA’s May 9, 2019 briefing 
instruction with Campbell’s inmate number listed in the addressee section). 
A second mailing was thus required; the new, properly addressed envelope was 
postmarked on July 26, 2019, and was received by Campbell soon after. See AR 5.2  As a 
result, the 30-day period prescribed by § 1252(b)(1), while inflexible once started, did not 
begin to run until July 26, 2019.  See Singh v. INS, 315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) 
 
1 Although the PFR is dated August 12, 2019, it was not received by this Court until 
September 26, 2019.  Regardless, we are not presented with evidence sufficient to 
undermine an August 12, 2019 filing date. Cf. Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 
1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (assuming, “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, . . . that a prisoner 
delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.”).  For its part, the 
Government does not mention the prison mailbox rule at all, either in its motion to 
dismiss or its response brief.  
  
2 It appears that Campbell received a copy of the BIA’s decision in early August 2019, 
and quickly filed a motion to reopen with the agency.  See AR 2-3.  The motion was 




(“[T]he time for filing a review petition begins to run when the BIA complies with the 
terms of federal regulations by mailing its decision to the petitioner’s address of 
record.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (“Service means physically presenting or mailing a 
document to the appropriate party or parties.”).3   
Accordingly, we conclude that Campbell’s PFR is timely under the particular 
circumstances of this case.4  We thus deny the Government’s motion to dismiss the PFR 
on timeliness grounds, and move on to the merits. 
III. 
Campbell raises a single issue in his opening brief, stated thus:  “My grandmother 
is a U.S. Citizen.  She brought me here to the U.S. and was my legal guardian therefore I 
should have been a citizen.”  Pet’r Br. (doc. 25) at 5; see also Gov’t Br. (doc. 28) at 19 
(“[T]he sole issue before the Court is whether the government is entitled to what amounts 
to summary judgment on Petitioner’s derivative citizenship claim.”).5   
We have jurisdiction to review nationality claims, including those asserting 
 
adverse reopening decision.  
3 One of the regulations analyzed by the court in Singh (8 C.F.R. § 3.1(f)) was moved to 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(f), without a change in verbiage, as a consequence of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002. 68 FR 9824 (Feb. 28, 2003). 
 
4 Because the chronology of events is confirmed by documentary evidence, there is no 
need to remand for factfinding.  Cf. Jahjaga v. Att’y Gen., 512 F.3d 80, 86 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
5 Campbell waited until his reply brief to challenge the BIA’s CAT ruling, and did not 
challenge the BIA’s PSC and remand rulings at all.  As a result, we agree with the 




derivative citizenship.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A).  If the claim presents no genuine 
issue of material fact, we decide it as a matter of law; otherwise, we transfer proceedings 
to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing.  See id.  In determining whether a 
genuine issue of material fact is presented, we employ principles of summary judgment 
practice.  See Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 421 F.3d 224, 229–30 (3d Cir. 2005). 
  Campbell’s derivative-citizenship claim, moreover, is subject to the requirements 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)–(b), because he entered the United States—and was allegedly 
adopted by his grandmother—in late 2001, after the effective date of the Child 
Citizenship Act of 2000.  See Brandao v. Att’y Gen., 654 F.3d 427, 428 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2011); cf. Cabrera v. Att’y Gen., 921 F.3d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 2019) (“When reviewing 
citizenship claims, we apply the laws that were in effect at the time of the relevant 
event—i.e., the petitioner’s birth, adoption, or eighteenth birthday.”).  We thus analyze 
the claim in light of those requirements.  Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (providing that child 
born abroad automatically becomes a U.S. citizen when (1) at least one parent is a U.S. 
citizen; (2) the child is under 18 years old; and (3) the child is residing in the U.S. in the 
legal and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to LPR status). 
As noted above, Campbell’s claim is based on his assertion that he was adopted by 
his United States-citizen grandmother.  It appears that Campbell would qualify as a 
citizen under § 1431(a) if he were able to satisfy “the requirements applicable to adopted 
 




children under [8 U.S.C. §] 1101(b)(1).”  8 U.S.C. § 1431(b).6  That means, based on the 
nature of the claim presented, that Campbell would have had to supply the agency with 
evidence he was under the age of 16 when adopted and had been residing under his 
grandmother’s legal custody for at least two years.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i).   
And that is where Campbell’s claim falls short.  There is no genuine dispute of 
fact concerning whether Campbell resided with his grandmother in the United States 
before age 17, under her legal custody or otherwise:  He did not.  See, e.g., AR 7 
(undated letter from Campbell’s grandmother) (“In January 2001, my Grandson was 
staying with my daughter/his Aunt in Jamaica. * * * Once he arrived to the United States, 
he remained under my supervision.”); AR 35 (Campbell:  “I was born . . . on August 2, 
1984, and immigrated to the United States on October 27, 2011 at the age of 17 years old 
as a permanent resident.”).  As a matter of law, then, Campbell is not a United States 
citizen.  His derivative citizenship claim is without merit.  
Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, Campbell’s petition for review will 
be denied. 
 
6 There is no dispute that Campbell entered the United States when he was “under the age 
of eighteen years,” 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(2), and that his grandmother became a naturalized 
United States citizen prior thereto, cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(1).  Campbell would also 
appear to satisfy the final requirement (§ 1431(a)(3)), so long as he were able to qualify 
as a “child” under § 1101(b)(1).   
